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This note details two comments on a recent policy proposal in Comello and Reichelstein 
(2014) aimed at favouring the early adoption of Carbon Capture (CC) technology in the next 
generation of thermal-based power plants to be installed in the United States. 
 
Introduction 
The prohibitively high cost of CC technology for first-of-a-kind plants is recurrently cited as a major 
barrier to its large-scale deployment. To overcome this problem, Comello and Reichelstein (2014) 
recently articulate an innovative policy proposal to enable substantial cost reductions by leveraging the 
sizeable deployment of thermal-based power generation projected in the U.S. during the period 2017-
2027. The proposal combines two ingredients: a binding and inflexible emission standard; and the 
“Accelerated Carbon Capture Deployment” (ACCD) – a preannounced schedule of Investment Tax 
Credits (ITC) and Production Tax Credits (PTC) – aimed at providing an incentive for newly built 
power plants in the U.S. to adopt CC immediately.  
This brief note extends the analysis by considering two issues. In a first section, we apply the 
framework detailed in the original article1 to generate a schedule of tax-credits that is robust to 
alternative scenarios for CC deployments outside the U.S. In a second section, we reflect on the 
possible emergence of a coordination game capable of hampering the desired early deployment of that 
technology and propose a modified schedule of tax-credits that is sufficient to overcome that problem.  
                                                 
1
 The two authors must be praised for having made their data and spreadsheet model readily available to readers. 
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1 – The role of early CC deployments outside the U.S. 
Using a list of proposed but still undecided projects (GCCSI, 2013), the authors assume the 
installation of nearly 3 GW of foreign CC capabilities between 2014 and 2020. However, in Europe, 
the funding of large CC projects has recently proven to be difficult causing delays and several project 
cancelations (Lupion and Herzog, 2013). As early foreign projects are posited to engender 
international spillovers, one may wonder whether these withdrawals could undermine the proposal’s 
success.  
To render the proposal robust to the vicissitudes impacting foreign projects, we consider a ‘worst-
case’ scenario whereby foreign deployments are restricted to the unique Canadian 130MW power 
plant finalized in 2014. To compensate for the absence of foreign early investments, augmented ITC 
and PTC schedules are needed (cf., Figure 1) but our evaluations confirm that this robust version is 
almost as attractive as the initial version:2  
• The Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) obtained with a facility that becomes operational by 
the end of 2027 is approximately 7.9 ¢/kWh if CC technology is consistently adopted by all 
the newly built U.S. thermal power plants.3  
• The magnitude of the tax-credit levels remain politically acceptable (cf., Figure 1). 
• Overall, the cumulated (undiscounted) foregone tax revenue to the U.S. Treasury reaches 
about $8.2 billion.4 This robust schedule of incentives thus represents a cost-effective solution 
for achieving a large scale deployment of this innovative technology.   
Figure 1. The modified ACCD tax credits schedule under a robust scenario 
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ] 
2 – Strategic interactions among CC adopters 
Recent European literature on CC and storage has highlighted the interactions that exist among CC 
adopters connected to a common infrastructure system (Mendelevitch, 2014; Massol, et al., 2015). In 
the present paper, infrastructure issues are neglected but the use of an experience curve de facto 
generates some interactions. It is instructive to examine these interactions further. 
                                                 
2
 For the sake of brevity, this note solely summarizes our main conclusions. Further details on the methods used to generate 
the results are provided in a Supporting Document to be disseminated as a companion file to this paper. 
3
 This figure remains close to the 7.8 ¢/kWh obtained in the original article (Comello and Reichelstein, 2014 - Finding 3). 
4
 This 25% increase over the base-case scenario reveals the positive externality provided by foreign early investments in first-
of-a-kind CC plants. 
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Our discussion is structured as follows. A first subsection reviews the evaluation of the schedule of 
tax-credits used in the original article. The second subsection focuses on CC adoption in a given year 
by several players and proves that the incentives offered that year may not be sufficient to rule out the 
possible occurrence of a coordination game with multiple equilibria. As uniqueness is not achieved, 
these players may select an equilibrium where some emitters rationally prefer to delay CC adoption. 
As that phenomenon may jeopardize the desired policy outcomes, the third subsection identifies an 
appropriately augmented minimum level of incentives that is sufficient to overcome that issue. The 
last subsection reports the numerical results obtained using the associated ITC and PTC schedules. For 
the sake of brevity, all the formal proofs are provided in a Supporting Document. 
A – The subsidy scheme in Comello and Reichelstein (2014) 
We consider a given year t  in { }2017,..., 2027  and let: tK  denote the total planned capacity of all 
the power plants to be installed during that year; and tCK  denote the state variable that gives the 
cumulated CC capacity already installed during the preceding years.5  
For an investor that considers installing a power plant during that year, we let: Rtc  denote the LCOE 
obtained in case of a ‘last-minute retrofit’ by the end of 2027, 6 and ( )Ntc x  be the strictly decreasing 
function that gives the LCOE if that plants adopts CC immediately given x , the cumulated CC in 
operation at that date.7  
In year t , we do not model the tax-credits but simply assume that their effect is to lower the LCOE 
measured on a power plant that early adopts CC capabilities. We let tS  be the levelized subsidy and  
( ) ( ):N Nt t tc x c x S= −ɶ  denote the subsidized LCOE function.  
Recall that the ACCD tax-credits are set so that, for a facility to be installed in a given year, it 
becomes advantageous to adopt CC capabilities immediately compared to retrofitting that plant by the 
end of 2027. The evaluation of the schedule of tax-credits presented in the original paper is detailed in 
an associated spreadsheet model: the “NGCC + CC Calculator” (Comello and Reichelstein, 2014). In 
this model, CC adoption at the maximum level is assumed in each year t  so that the cumulated CC 
capacity available at the beginning of the next year is 1t t tCK CK K+ = + . The tax-credits are 
                                                 
5
 Hence, tCK  is the sum of the capacities of all the CC plants that are already in operations when year t  begins. 
6
 As all power plants installed between 2017 and 2027 are forced to adopt CC by the end of that year, this LCOE figure is 
systematically evaluated assuming that 
2027
2017 2017
CK Kττ =+∑  is the cumulated CC capacity in operation at that time. 
7
 As discussed in the original paper, this LCOE figure takes into consideration a 10% first-of-a-kind premium if the 
cumulated capacity x  is lower than the first 3 GW.   
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calibrated so that tS , the levelized subsidy implemented in year t , verifies ttS S≥ , where tS  is the 
threshold level:  
( ): N Rt t t t tS c CK K c= + − ,         (1) 
The authors underline that, by construction, the tax-credits prevent possible ‘deviation’ from what they 
name an ‘equilibrium path’ of early CC adoption. Indeed, if one models CC adoption as a one-shot 
game involving 11 players (one for each year) where each player faces a binary choice with respect to 
early CC adoption for the entire capacity tK , the proposed subsidy makes ‘early adoption’ the best 
response of every player when the other players also jointly decide ‘early adoption’. In this game, the 
proposed schedule of tax-credits thus makes the decision vector stating ‘early adoption’ for every 
player a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE). 
B – Is that proposed subsidy sufficient? 
In reality, the problem at hand involves a sequence of annual decisions and the cumulated impact of 
installed CC capacity on future LCOE figures generates a ‘path dependency’ to past CC adoption 
decisions. The capacity forecasts and the standard plant size used by the authors together suggest that 
several power stations will be installed in some years (particularly during the period 2023 – 2027). As 
these plants are likely to be owned by independent companies, one may wonder whether, in each year 
t , the threshold level tS  is sufficient to induce the joint early adoption of CC capability by all the 
plants to be installed that year.  
To address this issue, one has to examine the strategic interactions among the plants to be installed in a 
given year. To clarify the presentation, we consider a simplified case and assume that two identical 
plants of size 2tK  are installed in year t . These plants are controlled by two independent players 
labeled ‘1’ and ‘2’ and we posit that each player faces a binary choice with respect to the immediate 
installation of CC capabilities. We also assume that early CC adoption has already been decided by all 
predecessors so that the cumulated CC capacity available at the beginning of the year is 
1
2017 2017
t
tCK CK Kττ
−
=
= +∑ .  
The ‘unsubsidized’ game 
The objective of each player is to minimize its LCOE. Absent any tax-credits, their strategic 
interactions can be summarized with the ‘unsubsidized’ normal form game in Table 1.   
Table 1. The ‘unsubsidized’ normal form game 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ] 
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Following the authors, we posit that it pays to delay CC adoption when the rival adopts the CC 
technology early:  
( )R Nt t t tc c CK K< + .         (2)  
As Ntc  is assumed to be a strictly decreasing function, it also pays to delay CC adoption when the rival 
does not early adopt the capture technology.8 Hence, the condition (2) indicates that ‘late adoption’ is 
a strictly dominant strategy for a player and therefore the pure strategy where both players decide ‘late 
adoption’ is the unique NE. Hence, absent any tax-credits, the two players rationally prefer to delay 
CC adoption. 
Emergence of a coordination game 
We now examine the case where tax-credits are implemented and consider the levelized subsidy level, 
tS . For a player that early adopts CC capabilities, the payoff is now given by the subsidized LCOE. 
The ‘subsidized’ normal form game is thus derived from the ‘unsubsidized’ one by using the 
subsidized LCOE function  
N
tcɶ  in lieu of the unsubsidized one. Two results can be highlighted for the 
‘subsidized’ normal form game. 
Finding 1 – For any levelized subsidy that verifies ttS S≥ , the strategy vector stating ‘early 
adoption’ for each player is a NE of the subsidized game. 
Finding 2 – Implementing a levelized subsidy tS  that verifies ttS S≥  may not be large 
enough for the strategy (‘early adoption’, ‘early adoption’) to be the unique NE. In particular, a 
subsidy level ttS S=  is such that (‘late adoption’, ‘late adoption’) remains a NE. 
Together, these two findings suggest that implementing a levelized subsidy that solely verifies 
ttS S≥  could lead to a coordination game with possibly several NEs.  
However, the existence of a NE other than the one that provides early CC adoption at level tK  in year 
t  is a source of concern. The following finding proves that a lower-than-expected level of CC 
adoption in year t  may undermine the ability of the proposed schedule of levelized subsidies to also 
achieve the early adoption of CC capabilities in subsequent years.  
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  Because ( )
2
R N N t
t t t t t t
K
c c CK K c CK < + < + 
 
. 
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Finding 3 – Possible existence of a snowball effect: If delayed adoption were to be decided by 
some players in year t , a levelized subsidy 1tS +  that solely verifies the condition 11 ttS S ++ ≥  
can be too small to make ‘early adoption’ of CC capabilities the best response of an investor in 
year 1t + . 
C – A remedy 
Because of this possible snowball effect, one may desire that the schedule of levelized subsidies rules 
out any possibility for the investors in any given year t  to pick up a NE that does not lead to 
generalized early CC adoption. As there can be between-year variations in the number of players and 
in the sizes of their plants, we believe that it is preferable to opt for a threshold level that is large 
enough to be independent from these considerations. The following proposition offers a sufficient 
condition for generalized CC adoption to occur.  
Proposition – In each year t , any tax-credits yielding a levelized subsidy tS  that verifies 
ɵ
ttS S≥ , with ɵ ( ): N Rt t t tS c CK c= −  where 12017 2017: tt tCK CK Kτ−== +∑  is the cumulated CC 
capacity available at the beginning of year t , systematically induces the installation of a CC 
capacity tK . 
D – Application 
This subsection reports the results obtained using the minimum threshold above. The numerical 
evaluations have been conducted assuming the robust capacity deployment scenario discussed in 
Section 1.9  
Compared to the values in the original article, our evaluations indicate that the magnitude of the ITC 
levels remains similar; however, substantially augmented PTC are needed (cf., Figure 2).  
Figure 2. The tax credit schedule needed to obtain a unique NE  
[ INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ] 
These new levels generate a substantial increase in the cumulative (undiscounted) foregone tax 
revenue to the U.S. Treasury: about $14.1 billion. This is a 110% increase over the figure obtained in 
the original article. Nevertheless, we believe that this cost figure remains tolerable for such an 
ambitious policy, especially one that would now be rendered robust to both foreign adverse events and 
domestic gaming issues.  
                                                 
9
 For the sake of brevity, this note solely summarizes our main conclusions. Further details on the methods used to generate 
the results are provided in a Supporting Document to be disseminated as a companion file to this paper. 
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Conclusions 
This note discusses the feasibility of the policy proposal in Comello and Reichelstein (2014). Two 
lines of arguments have been considered. First, we have examined the effects of early CC deployments 
outside the U.S. Second, we have determined that the initially proposed ACCD schedule can be 
insufficient to engender the desired generalized early adoption of CC capabilities because of the 
possible co-existence of multiple Nash equilibria. In both cases, a modified version of the policy has 
been proposed using the detailed cost structure developed in Comello and Reichelstein (2014). Though 
higher incentive levels have been obtained, our findings confirm that the cost of the proposed ACCD 
policy to the U.S. Treasury is not out of reach. This modified policy thus represents an interesting 
instrument to break the ‘vicious circle’ that currently hampers the deployment of CC technologies. 
Acknowledgements 
The views expressed here and any remaining errors are our sole responsibility. 
References 
Comello, S., Reichelstein, S., (2014). Incentives for early adoption of carbon capture technology. 
Energy Policy, 74, 579–588. 
GCCSI, (2013). Global CCS Institute Status of CCS Project Database.URL: 
http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/data/status-ccs-project-database. 
Lupion, M., Herzog, H.J, (2013). NER300: Lessons learnt in attempting to secure CCS projects in 
Europe, International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 19, 19–25. 
Massol, O., Tchung-Ming, S., Banal-Estañol, A., (2015). Joining the CCS Club! The economics of 
CO2 pipeline projects. European Journal of Operational Research, doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2015.05.034. 
Forthcoming.    
Mendelevitch, R., (2014). The role of CO2-EOR for the development of a CCTS infrastructure in the 
North Sea Region: A techno-economic model and applications. International Journal of Greenhouse 
Gas Control, 20, 132–159. 
APPENDIX 
Cf. the companion document.  
  
 8 
Figure 1. The modified ACCD tax credits schedule under a robust scenario 
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Table 1. The ‘unsubsidized’ normal form game 
  Player 2 
  Late adoption Early adoption 
Pl
ay
er
 
1 
Late 
adoption 
R
t
c  ; R
t
c  
R
t
c  ; 
2
N t
t t
K
c CK +  
 
 
Early 
adoption 2
N t
t t
K
c CK +  
 
 ; R
t
c  ( )N
t t t
c CK K+  ; ( )N
t t t
c CK K+  
Note: In this paper, the objective of each player is to minimize its LCOE. 
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Figure 2. The tax credit schedule needed to obtain a unique NE 
(a) Modified ITC schedule 
 
(b) Modified PTC schedule 
 
(c) The modified schedule of government expenditures 
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Supporting Document: 
Incentives for early adoption of carbon capture technology: 
Further considerations from a European perspective 
 
Albert BANAL-ESTAÑOL  Jeremy ECKHAUSE Olivier MASSOL
 
********* 
This document constitutes a technical appendix to the aforementioned paper.  
• Appendix A (respectively Appendix C) clarifies the assumptions and methodology used to 
generate the numerical results commented in Section 1 (respectively Section 2) of the paper.  
• Appendix B presents the mathematical proofs of the Finding 1, 2 and 3 and the Proposition 
stated in Section 2 of the paper. 
********* 
Appendix A – The role of non-U.S. CC adoptions, a sensitivity 
analysis 
This Appendix details the assumptions, methodology and results commented in Section 1. 
A.1  Assumptions 
Table A.1 details the projected annual capacity deployments by year retained in the ‘worst case’ 
scenario. This conservative projection has been derived from Comello and Reichelstein (2014, 
Supporting document - Table A.1.) by restraining the amount of international capacity to the unique 
130 MW Carbon Capture (CC) power plant that is currently in operation in Canada. Capacity 
deployment excepted, our assumptions are the ones discussed in the original article. 
  
 2 
Table A.1. Projected U.S. Capacity Deployments of NGCC Facilities and International 
Capacity Deployments of Carbon Capture Technology in the Robust Scenario 
Year 
Projected Annual 
Int'l Additions of 
Capture Unit 
Capacity (GCCSI) 
[MW] 
Projected Annual 
Capacity Additions 
2017-2027 (EIA) 
[MW] 
Total Annual 
Capacity Additions 
[MW] 
Total Cumulative 
Capacity Additions 
[MW] 
Projected Net NGCC 
Capacity 2017-2027 
(EIA) [MW] 
2014 130  130 130 189 939 
2015 0  0 130 192 122 
2016 0  0 130 192 447 
2017 0 0 0 130 192 447 
2018 0 0 0 130 192 220 
2019 0 690 690 820 192 910 
2020 0 432 432 1 252 193 342 
2021  272 272 1 524 193 615 
2022  450 450 1 974 194 064 
2023  5350 5 350 7 324 199 414 
2024  2389 2 389 9 712 201 803 
2025  5907 5 907 15 619 207 710 
2026  4307 4 307 19 926 212 017 
2027  6828 6 828 26 754 218 845 
A.2  Methodology 
We proceed as in Comello and Reichelstein (2014) and identify the minimum incentives required to 
bridge the gap between: (i) the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) of a facility that is retrofitted in 
2027, and (ii) the LCOE of a plant that immediately adopts CC capabilities. For each year, the 
minimum investment tax credit (respectively production tax credits) is calibrated so that the levelized 
capacity (respectively variable) cost in case of immediate CC adoption1 is equal to those incurred in 
case of a retrofit in 2027.2  
A.3  Results 
In Table A.2, we detail the “Accelerated Carbon Capture Deployment” (ACCD) tax credits obtained in 
the robust scenario. These results have been generated using an adapted version of the original 
NGCC+CC Calculator.3  
  
                                                          
1
 For the sake of comparability, this levelized cost is determined using the fiscal depreciation schedules and the 10% first-of-
a-kind premium defined in Comello and Reichelstein (2014). 
2
 Note that these minimum tax credits schedule are not necessarily tiered. The use of different fiscal depreciation schedules 
between two successive years can generate a situation whereby the investment tax credit needed in a given year is larger than 
that needed during the previous year. To overcome that issue, we proceed as in the NGCC+CC Calculator and generate tiered 
schedules. In this paper, a linear programming approach is implemented to obtain these tiered schedules. The linear program 
is aimed at determining the tiered tax credit schedule that minimizes the cumulative foregone tax revenue to the U.S. 
Treasury and verifies two types of constraints: (i) the tiered tax credit in a given year must not be lower than that of the 
subsequent year, and (ii) the tiered tax credits must not be lower than the minimum values required for the LCOE of a new 
plant to be lower than the LCOE of a plant retrofitted in 2027. 
3
 This modified spreadsheet model named “NGCC+CC Cost Calculator_Section 1.xlsx” can be downloaded from Olivier 
Massol’s webpage: https://sites.google.com/site/oliviermassolshomepage/working-papers   
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Table A.2. The ACCD tax credits in the Robust Scenario 
Year 
Fiscal Depreciation 
Schedule 
Schedule of 
Investment Tax 
Credits 
Schedule of 
Production Tax 
Credits 
[¢/kWh] 
2017 MACRS 22.4% 2.41 
2018 MACRS 20.9% 2.41 
2019 MACRS 19.1% 2.41 
2020 MACRS 17.4% 2.41 
2021 MACRS 15.2% 2.41 
2022 MACRS 13.1% 2.41 
2023 MACRS 10.0% 0.94 
2024 150% DB 10.0% 0.84 
2025 150% DB 4.4% 0.48 
2026 150% DB 0.2% 0.21 
2027 150% DB 0.0% 0.00 
Note: MACRS indicates that all capital expenditures will be eligible for the five-year accelerated 
depreciation schedule according to MACRS; 150% DB indicates that all capital expenditures will be 
subject to the current 150% balance, 20-year depreciation schedule. 
Appendix B – Mathematical proofs 
This Appendix presents the formal proofs of the results stated in Section 2. Unless otherwise specified, 
the notation is based on the one introduced in the paper. 
Finding 1 – For any levelized subsidy that verifies ttS S≥ , the strategy vector stating ‘early 
adoption’ for each player is a Nash equilibrium of the subsidized game. 
Proof: Suppose both players decide ‘early adoption’. Each player incurs the subsidized 
LCOE: ( ) ( )N Nt t t t t t tc CK K c CK K S+ = + −ɶ . As ttS S≥ , the condition ( )N Rt t t tc CK K c+ ≤ɶ
is de facto verified which indicates that ‘early adoption’ is the best response of a player 
whenever its rival also picks that strategy.     Q.E.D. 
Finding 2 – Implementing a levelized subsidy tS  that verifies ttS S≥  may not be large enough for 
the strategy (‘early adoption’, ‘early adoption’) to be the unique Nash equilibrium. In particular, a 
subsidy level ttS S=  is such that (‘late adoption’, ‘late adoption’) remains a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: We have to check the conditions for the vector (‘late adoption’, ‘late adoption’) to no 
longer be a Nash equilibrium. We examine the best response of a player when the rival 
decides ‘late adoption’. The condition for that player to systematically prefer ‘early adoption’ 
when the rival decides ‘late adoption’ is 
2
t
t
N R
t t
K
CKc c+  < 
 
ɶ
 which calls for a levelized 
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subsidy that verifies the condition: ttS S>  where 2:
Rt
t t
N
t t
K
CK cS c + = − 
 
. As Ntc  is a 
strictly decreasing function, the threshold tS  verifies t tS S> .    Q.E.D. 
Finding 3 – Possible existence of a snowball effect: If delayed adoption were to be decided by some 
players in year t , a levelized subsidy 1tS +  that solely verifies the condition 11 ttS S ++ ≥  can be too 
small to make ‘early adoption’ of CC capabilities the best response of an investor in year 1t + . 
Proof: Because of non-adoption, we assume that the CC capacity constructed in year t  attains 
a level tk  with t tk K< . If the levelized subsidy scheduled during the next year is set such that 
11 ttS S ++ = , the subsidized LCOE obtained in case of adoption verifies  
( )11 1t t t
N R
t tCK k kc c++ ++ + >ɶ   for any level of CC adoption [ ]1 10,t tk K+ +∈  in year 1t +  (because 
1
N
tc +  is a strictly decreasing function).       Q.E.D. 
Proposition – In each year t , any tax credits yielding a levelized subsidy tS  that verifies ɵ ttS S≥ , 
with ɵ ( ): N Rt t t tS c CK c= −  where 12017 2017: tt tCK CK Kτ−== +∑  is the cumulated CC capacity available 
at the beginning of year t , systematically induces the installation of a CC capacity tK . 
Proof: We assume that a player has to build a unique power plant of capacity [ ]0,t tx K∈  in 
year t  and let ɶ [ ]0,t t tx K x∈ −  be the aggregate amount of CC capacities decided by its 
rivals. If the levelized subsidy tS  is such that ɵ ttS S≥ , the LCOE obtained in case of early CC 
adoption systematically verifies  ɶ( ) ɶ( ) ( )tt tN N N Rt tt t t t t tCK xc x c CK x x c CK c+ + ≤ + + − +ɶ . As 
N
tc  is a decreasing function and ɶ tt t tCK x x CK+ + ≥ , we have  ɶ( )tt tN Rt tCK xc x c+ + ≤ɶ  for 
any ɶ tx  in [ ]0, t tK x−  which indicates that this player’s best response is systematically to 
implement CC immediately. Applying that reasoning to any other player in year t indicates 
that early CC adoption is a dominant strategy for that player which indicates that the 
generalized early adoption of CC capabilities by all the investors is the unique Nash 
equilibrium.         Q.E.D. 
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Appendix C – A robust schedule of ITC and PTC that is immune to 
strategic gaming considerations 
This Appendix details the assumptions and results commented in Section 2. 
C.1  Assumptions and methodology 
The simulation is based on the projected capacity deployments retained in Appendix A (Table A.1). 
We follow the methodology in Appendix A.2 except that the tax credits are now calibrated so as to 
provide a levelized subsidy that is at least as large as the threshold level mentioned in the Proposition 
in Section 2. These tax credits thus prevent the existence of Nash equilibriums where some emitters 
could rationally prefer to delay CC adoption. 
C.2  Results 
In Table C.1, we detail the “Accelerated Carbon Capture Deployment” (ACCD) tax credits obtained in 
the robust scenario when the incentives are derived from the levelized subsidy discussed in the 
Proposition in Section 2. These results have been generated using an adapted version of the original 
NGCC+CC Calculator.4  
Table C.A. The ACCD tax credits in the Robust Scenario 
Year 
Fiscal Depreciation 
Schedule 
Schedule of 
Investment Tax 
Credits 
Schedule of 
Production Tax 
Credits 
[¢/kWh] 
2017 MACRS 22.4% 2.78 
2018 MACRS 20.9% 2.78 
2019 MACRS 19.1% 2.78 
2020 MACRS 17.4% 2.78 
2021 MACRS 15.2% 2.78 
2022 MACRS 13.1% 2.78 
2023 MACRS 11.2% 2.78 
2024 150% DB 11.2% 1.11 
2025 150% DB 6.7% 1.05 
2026 150% DB 1.4% 0.62 
2027 150% DB 0.0% 0.00 
Note: MACRS indicates that all capital expenditures will be eligible for the five-year accelerated 
depreciation schedule according to MACRS; 150% DB indicates that all capital expenditures will be 
subject to the current 150% balance, 20-year depreciation schedule. 
                                                          
4
 This modified spreadsheet model named “NGCC+CC Cost Calculator_Section 2.xlsx” can be downloaded from Olivier 
Massol’s webpage: https://sites.google.com/site/oliviermassolshomepage/working-papers   
